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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that due
1
process under the Fourteenth Amendment consists of both
2
procedural and substantive components. The procedural aspect
ensures that adequate procedure is provided when the government
or government actors take life, liberty, or property from an
3
individual. The substantive component ensures that fundamental
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1
The Constitution contains Due Process Clauses in both the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. The Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause applies to the federal government and reads, “No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to state and
local governments and provides, “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause is the means by which Congress has incorporated
most of the Bill of Rights and made them applicable to the states. Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
2
“Although a literal reading of the [Due Process] Clause might suggest that it
governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for at
least 105 years . . . [it] has been understood to contain a substantive component as
well, one ‘barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.’” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
3
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). The Mathews court laid out the
test to determine whether due process has been provided.
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
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rights are protected from governmental intrusion; hence, it is said to
5
add “substance” to the normally procedural Due Process Clause.
Under the substantive component of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has recognized
many familial rights. These include the right to companionship,
6
care, custody, and management of minor children; the right to keep
7
8
the family together; the right to child-rearing; and the right to marry
9
and procreate. Recently, several circuit courts have addressed the
issue of whether parents have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
10
interest in the continued association of their adult children. While
the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that parents do have
a constitutionally protected right of companionship in their adult
11
children, the First, Third, and D.C. Circuits have held that they do
12
not. The issue might have been resolved by the Supreme Court in
two cases in which certiorari was granted, but in both cases certiorari
13
was dismissed as improvidently granted.
Id. at 335.
4
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. at 847 (quoting Justice Brandeis
in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) saying, “it is settled that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as
well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the
term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States.”)
5
James W. Hilliard, To Accomplish Fairness and Justice: Substantive Due Process, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 95, 95 (1996). For a thorough discussion of the concept of
substantive due process as based on traditional American political theory, see id. at
95-104. See also James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the
Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 320-45 (1999).
6
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
7
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
8
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
10
Such a right would allow recovery to a parent upon the wrongful death of a
child who was above the statutory age of minority. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Dodd, 352
F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2003); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001); Ortiz v. Burgos, 807
F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986); Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986);
Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of Santa Fe, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th
Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
11
Bell, 746 F.2d at 1243; Lee, 250 F.3d at 685-86; Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 748, 748
n.1; Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1189.
12
Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 822; Butera, 235 F.3d at 656.
13
Espinoza v. O’Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 430
(1982); Jones v. Hildebrant, 550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), cert. dismissed, 432 U.S. 183
(1977). In Espinoza, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed certiorari for lack of
finality. Espinoza, 456 U.S. at 430. In Jones, the Supreme Court dismissed certiorari
because Petitioner initially had claimed that her case was based on her personal
liberty interest in raising her child without governmental interference, but
afterwards, indicated that her claim was based on her unconstitutional deprivation of
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This Comment articulates the view that a right of
companionship in adult children should be recognized. Part I of this
Comment outlines general substantive due process analysis guidelines
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II examines various familial
rights that the Supreme Court has recognized under the Due Process
Clause. Part III surveys cases that have dealt with the right of
companionship between parents and adult children. Part IV looks at
recent social and economic trends that urge recognition of the right.
Finally, this Comment concludes that recognition of a parental right
of companionship in adult children is in line with general substantive
due process analysis, and provides a framework for the scope of such
a right.
I.

GENERAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
used the substantive component of the Due Process Clause to protect
economic freedom of contract, which the Court saw as a fundamental
14
right.
The Court invalidated as many as two hundred state
economic laws based on the implied fundamental right to freedom of
15
contract found under the substantive Due Process Clause. By the
mid-1930s, however, economic substantive due process came under
attack as the Great Depression placed tremendous pressure on the
16
government to play a more active role in the economy. Since 1937,
the Supreme Court has shied away from using the Due Process Clause
17
to invalidate state economic laws.
The Court, however, has not shown similar restraint in the noneconomic arena. Under the substantive Due Process Clause, the
Court has found that many non-economic rights are fundamental
property. Jones, 432 U.S. at 184-89.
14
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court held that a law enacted
by the New York state legislature, which regulated the maximum number of hours
that a baker could work, was violative of the individual’s right to freedom of contract
under the substantive Due Process Clause. Id. at 64. The case marked the start of
what is known as the “Lochner era,” in which the Court is said to have trammeled over
state police powers. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). The
Court’s broad definition of liberty under Lochner, however, has never been officially
rejected. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the
Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 319
(1991). While the negative history of the substantive Due Process Clause “counsels
caution and restraint, . . . it does not counsel abandonment.” Moore, 431 U.S. at 502.
15
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 592 (2d ed.
2002).
16
Id. at 597.
17
Id. at 601.
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18

including: the right to marry, the right to the companionship, care,
19
and custody of one’s children, the right to keep the family
20
21
together, the right to control the upbringing of one’s children, the
22
23
right to get an abortion, the right to refuse medical treatment, and
24
numerous other rights.
The process by which the Court implies fundamental rights via
the substantive Due Process Clause is far from an exact science.
Justice Harlan described this unempirical analysis in his famous
25
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that
can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it
has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon
postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck
26
between that liberty and the demands of organized society.

Because the Supreme Court has recognized that substantive due
process analysis often has little backing in the text of the
Constitution, the Court follows a conservative path when deciding
27
which rights are and are not fundamental. As an initial principle,
the Court has warned that there should be “great resistance” to
28
expanding the substantive reach of the Due Process Clause.
Despite its pervasive indefiniteness, substantive due process
analysis consistently follows some general guidelines. The Court’s
18

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
20
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
21
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
22
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
24
This rather broad recognition of rights has had its critics. Substantive due
process has often been chided as the judiciary’s means by which to interject its
personal beliefs into constitutional law-making. John Hart Ely stated, “[W]e
apparently need periodic reminding that ‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction
in terms – sort of like ‘green pastel redness’.” JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980). Also, Robert H. Bork called
substantive due process “a momentous sham.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990). Despite this criticism,
however, substantive due process in the non-economic sphere has remained strong
in the late twentieth century. Ely, supra note 5, at 315-16.
25
367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26
Id.
27
“The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194
(1986).
28
Id. at 195.
19
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first query is to determine the right at stake and to assess whether the
interest is a fundamental right that falls within the ambit of “life,
29
30
liberty,
or property” comprising the Due Process Clause.
In
ascertaining whether a fundamental right is at stake, the Court uses
broad guideposts such as: whether the right is “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would
31
exist if [it] were sacrificed,” if it is “deeply rooted in the Nation’s
32
history and tradition,” or, if it is “so rooted in the traditions and
33
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Hence,
there is a large emphasis on American tradition and culture to
determine whether a right is fundamental.
If the Court finds that the sought right represents American
34
historic traditions and values, a fundamental right is implicated. On
the other hand, if the Court finds that the sought right does not
represent the Nation’s traditional values, there is no implied
fundamental right cognizable in the Fourteenth Amendment
35
substantive Due Process Clause. While this describes the general
framework, the Court has recently departed somewhat from this
36
standard. For instance, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court found that
consenting adults had the right to engage in private homosexual
37
activity under the substantive Due Process Clause, even though the
argument that there were historical traditions underlying this type of
38
activity was tenuous.
29

In general, the Court has defined the “liberty” protected under the substantive
Due Process Clause very broadly. The Court has stated:
Without doubt, [“liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
30
Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV.
625, 630-31 (1992).
31
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)).
32
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
33
Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
34
See id.
35
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 765.
36
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
37
Id. at 578.
38
See id. at 570-72. The Court explained that historically, there were laws
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Based on whether or not the Court finds a fundamental right,
39
different levels of means-end scrutiny ensue. On one end, when the
Court finds that no fundamental right exists, a challenged
40
government action need only survive “rational basis” review. This
means that a government action allegedly depriving an individual of
a right must be a “rational” means for furthering a “legitimate”
41
government interest. Under this standard, the Court defers to the
government upon a finding of any valid reason for the government
42
action. At the other extreme, if a fundamental right is at stake, a
43
government action must survive “strict scrutiny” review. This means
banning homosexual acts, but argued that they generally were not enforced when
dealing with consenting adults acting in private. Id. On the other hand, the Court
acknowledged that “for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral.” Id. at 571. Given this incongruent historical
background, the Court concluded, “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point, but
not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” Id. at 572
(quoting Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
39
For the genesis of means-end scrutiny, see United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In general, the judiciary defers to the legislature unless
it finds that the government action infringes a fundamental right. See Hilliard, supra
note 5, at 105-06. Means-end scrutiny is also used for analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause, in which the judiciary defers to the legislature unless it finds that
the government action discriminates against a “discrete and insular” minority. See id.
The “discrete and insular” terminology comes from Carolene Products. 304 U.S. at
152, n.4. Means-end scrutiny under the Due Process Clause has only two tiers of
review, rational basis and strict scrutiny. See Hilliard, supra note 5, at 105. The
analysis for the Equal Protection Clause has three tiers, rational basis, strict scrutiny,
and an intermediate level of review. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 645-47. For an
argument urging the Court to adopt intermediate level scrutiny for the Due Process
Clause as well, see Leading Cases, Substantive Due Process – Intermediate Level Scrutiny,
106 HARV. L. REV. 210 (1992).
40
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 764.
41
Id. at 651. Although this is the gist of the test, rational basis review has been
phrased in numerous ways by the Supreme Court. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the Court said:
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. . . .
One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary.
Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79. In other instances, the Court has not articulated the test
to be so deferential. For example, in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920), the Court declared, “the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike.” Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415.
42
Hilliard, supra note 5, at 106. Although rational basis review is very deferential,
it is not merely a formality. Id. Courts have invalidated legislation under the
standard. Id.
43
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 767.

2005

1127

COMMENT

that the government action must be “necessary”
45
“compelling” government interest.

44

to further a

II. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
INVOLVING THE FAMILY
Under the substantive Due Process Clause, the Court has
recognized various familial rights. This section will survey each of
these familial rights and discuss the context in which the Supreme
Court recognized these rights as fundamental.
A. The right to marry
The Court first held that the right to marry was a fundamental
right protected under the substantive Due Process Clause in Loving v.
46
Virginia. The case arose out of a Virginia law that made it illegal for
47
a white person to marry other than another white person. When a
white male Virginia resident married a black female Virginia resident,
48
both were sentenced to one year in prison. Although the bulk of
the Supreme Court’s opinion dealt with the statute’s violation of the
49
Equal Protection Clause, the Court posited that the statute also
50
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court noted, “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
51
happiness by free men.”
44

For an action to be “necessary,” the government must show that it could not
further its interest with less of an infringement on the fundamental right. Id.
45
Id.
46
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
47
Id. at 2.
48
Id. at 3. The trial judge suspended the sentence for twenty-five years as long as
the couple agreed to leave the state of Virginia and not to return together for that
period of time. Id.
49
The Court rejected the State’s argument that the statute should pass
constitutional muster because it applied equally to all races. Id. at 8.
There can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation
statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. . . . At
the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to
the ‘most rigid scrutiny,’ and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must
be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective . . . .

Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
50

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
Id. The Court also articulated, “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. . . . Under our Constitution,
the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.” Id.
51
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52

In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court reaffirmed the premise of
53
Loving that the right to marry is fundamental. Zablocki concerned a
Wisconsin statute that prevented a person from marrying if he had a
non-custodial minor child for whom he was required to pay child
54
support. The Court stated, “it would make little sense to recognize a
right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the
55
foundation of the family in our society.” Because the Court found
that the right to marry was a fundamental right, it applied strict
scrutiny review and held that none of the reasons for interfering with
the right were necessary to achieve a compelling government
56
interest.
Although the Court reaffirmed the right to marry as
fundamental in Zablocki, it did so under the Equal Protection
57
Clause. The Court, however, also adopted Loving’s view that the
right to marry was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
58
Process Clause.
In addition, Justice Stewart wrote a concurring
opinion arguing that the case should have been decided under due

52

434 U.S. 374 (1978).
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 386. The Court also noted that “[l]ong ago, the Court characterized
marriage as ‘the most important relation in life.’” Id. at 384 (quoting Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)). “It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been
placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships.” Id. at 386.
56
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388. The reasons provided for the statute were: (1) it
provided a mechanism by which people who had prior support obligations could be
counseled before they entered into a marital relationship from which they derived
even more support obligations; and (2) it protected the welfare of out-of-custody
children. Id. For more Supreme Court cases that recognize the right to marry as
fundamental, see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a state law
requiring prisoners to get permission from the superintendent before getting
married was unconstitutional) and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(holding that a state cannot require individuals to pay filing fees and court costs in
order to receive a divorce).
57
Id. at 382-83.
58
Id. at 383-84. As noted by the Zablocki court:
The Court’s opinion [in Loving] could have rested solely on the
ground that the statutes discriminated on the basis of race in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. But the Court went on to hold that the
laws arbitrarily deprived the couple of a fundamental liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry. The Court’s
language on the latter point bears repeating: “The freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 383 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
53
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59

The problem in this case is not one of discriminatory
classifications, but of unwarranted encroachment upon a
constitutionally protected freedom. I think that the Wisconsin
statute is unconstitutional because it exceeds the bounds of
permissible state regulation of marriage, and invades the sphere
of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
60
Amendment.

B. The right to keep the family together
The Supreme Court recognized the right to keep the family
61
together in Moore v. City of East Cleveland. The case concerned an
Ohio housing ordinance that restricted the categories of family
62
members that could live together in one household. Under the
ordinance, a grandmother was prohibited from living with her
63
grandson. The Court applied strict scrutiny review and held that
the ordinance was not necessary to achieve a compelling government
64
interest.
In holding the ordinance to be violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court noted, “[t]his Court
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
65
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
The Court
continued, “[a] host of cases . . . have consistently acknowledged a
66
‘private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’”
Additionally, the Court commented on the unsuitability of bright line
rules in substantive due process analysis, and the traditional value
67
that American society has placed on the institution of the family.
59

Id. at 391-403.
Id. at 391-92.
61
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
62
Id. at 495-96.
63
Id. at 499. The particular household consisted of a grandmother, her son, and
her two grandsons who were first cousins to each other. Id. at 496. John Moore, Jr.,
the grandson with whom it was a violation for the grandmother to live, came to live
with his grandmother when his mother died. Id. at 496-97.
64
Id. at 499-500. The city claimed that the governmental interests were (1)
“preventing overcrowding,” (2) “minimizing traffic and parking congestion,” and (3)
“avoiding an undue financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system.” Moore, 431
U.S. at 499-500. While the Court recognized that these were legitimate goals, it held
that the ordinance “serve[d] them marginally at best.” Id. at 500.
65
Id. at 499 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974)).
66
Id. (citations omitted).
67
Id. at 503-04.
60
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The Court emphasized that American tradition valued not only the
68
nuclear family, but also the extended, non-traditional family unit.
Thus, the Due Process Clause protects constitutional rights not only
69
for parents and children, but also for the extended family unit.
70
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,
which dealt with the rights of foster parents, the Court moved beyond
biological relationships and recognized that a parent-child bond
71
could be created even without a blood relationship.
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the
individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association,
and from the role it plays in ‘promot(ing) a way of life’ through
the instruction of children, as well as from the fact of blood
relationship. No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving
and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in
his or her care may exist even in the absence of a blood
72
relationship.

Despite this strong language, the Court did not affirmatively hold
that the relationship was protected by the Due Process Clause
73
because it opted to decide the case on narrower grounds. What is
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines
but rather from careful ‘respect for the teaching of history (and), solid recognition
of the basic values that underlie our society.’ Our decisions establish that the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural.
Id. (citations omitted).
68
Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-05.
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along
with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally
deserving of constitutional recognition. Over the years, millions of our
citizens have grown up in just such an environment, and most, surely,
have profited from it. Even if conditions of modern society have
brought about a decline in extended family households, they have not
erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the
centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports a larger
conception of the family. Out of choice, necessity, or a sense of family
responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw together
and participate in the duties and satisfactions of a common home.
Id.
69
See id.
70
431 U.S. 816 (1977).
71
Id. at 844.
72
Id. (citations omitted).
73
Id. at 847. Additionally, the Court also noted differences between foster
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clear, however, is that in both Moore and Smith, the Court chose not to
draw arbitrary lines deciding who was entitled to a fundamental right
under the substantive Due Process Clause.
C. The right to control upbringing of children
One of the first cases that dealt with familial substantive due
74
process rights, Meyer v. Nebraska, recognized the right of a parent to
control the upbringing of his or her children. The case concerned a
state law that proscribed teaching a subject in any language besides
English, and prohibited teaching a child any language other than
75
English before he or she passed eighth grade.
The Court
acknowledged that the statute’s purpose, to make English the mother
76
tongue of all American students, was legitimate, but held that the
law improperly interfered with the parent’s right to direct the
77
upbringing of his or her children. Two years later, in Pierce v. Society
78
of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, the Court again
recognized the right of parents to control and direct the upbringing
79
of their children.
Even when the governmental interest has been extremely
compelling, the Court has not allowed curtailment of a parent’s right
to control the upbringing of his or her children. For example, in
80
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court held that Amish parents had a
parents and biological parents. Id. at 845. For example, the Court explained that a
biological parent-child relationship existed entirely apart from the State, but a foster
parent-child relationship had state law as its source. Id.
74
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
75
Id. at 397.
76
Id. at 398.
77
Id. at 400.
78
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
79
Id. at 534-35. The case dealt with a state law that required children to attend
public schools. Id. at 530. The Court held that:
[T]he Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control . . . . The child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.
Id. at 534-35. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a child
labor law as applied to a minor girl engaging in religious solicitation did not violate
the parents’ substantive due process right in directing the upbringing of their child).
“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder . . . . But the family itself is not
beyond regulation in the public interest . . . .” Id. at 166.
80
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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right to decide not to send their children to school beyond eighth
81
The Court
grade despite a compulsory school attendance law.
noted, “a State’s interest in universal education, however highly we
rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges
on fundamental rights and interests, such as . . . the traditional
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
82
children.”
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, recently upheld the
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children even in
83
the face of objection by grandparents. In Troxel v. Granville, the
Court permitted a mother (“Granville”) to limit her two daughters’
84
visitation with their grandparents (“the Troxels”). In that case, a
Washington state law gave “any person” the right to petition for
visitation of a child, and authorized a court to grant visitation
whenever it found that granting visitation was within “the best
85
interest of the child.” After the father of the children committed
suicide, Granville decided to decrease the number of visits between
86
the Troxels and her daughters. In response, the Troxels filed a
87
Granville
petition seeking increased visitation with the children.
88
appealed when the state court allowed increased visitation.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the state court’s holding, first
noted that the right of parents to determine the upbringing of their
children was one of the oldest rights found under the substantive
89
Due Process Clause. The Court then faulted the state court for not
81

Id. at 234. The Amish believed that sending their children to school beyond
eighth grade would interfere with the inculcation of Amish values and way of life. Id.
at 210-11.
82
Id. at 214 (citations omitted).
83
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
84
Id. at 72-75. The Troxels were the grandparents on the father’s side. Id. at 60.
85
Id. at 60.
86
Id. at 60-61.
87
Id. at 61.
88
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. The court did not grant either party’s requested
visitation exactly, but granted compromised visitation somewhere in between what
each party had originally requested. Id.
89
“The liberty interest at issue in this case – the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Id. at 65. Justice Scalia agreed that the
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children was important, but
objected to the Court’s decision to grant it Constitutional protection:
In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children is among the “unalienable Rights” with which the Declaration
of Independence proclaims “all men . . . are endowed by their
Creator.” And in my view that right is also among the “othe[r] [rights]
retained by the people” which the Ninth Amendment says the
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giving Granville’s determination of her children’s best interest the
90
deference that it deserved. Thus, the Court held that a parent’s
right to control the upbringing of her children was expansive enough
to override any right that grandparents may have to seek increased
91
visitation.
D. The right to companionship, care, custody, and management of
one’s children
The Court recognized the right to the companionship, care,
92
custody, and management of one’s children in Stanley v. Illinois.
The case arose out of a situation where a couple, Joan and Peter
Stanley, had lived together intermittently for eighteen years, having
93
three children together. After Joan died, the children were placed
with court-appointed guardians pursuant to an Illinois law that
required children of unwed fathers to become wards of the State
94
upon the mother’s death. Peter Stanley sued arguing that he had
95
been denied the equal protection of the laws.
Stanley claimed that since married fathers and unwed mothers
could not be deprived of their children without a showing of parental
unfitness, he, as an unwed father, had been denied the equal
96
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
the case dealt mainly with equal protection and procedural due
process, the Court relied in part on previous substantive Due Process
cases respecting the family in finding that Peter Stanley had been
Constitution’s enumeration of rights “shall not be construed to deny or
disparage.” The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal
prescription conferring powers upon the courts; and the Constitution’s
refusal to “deny or disparage” other rights is far removed from
affirming any one of them, and even further removed from authorizing
judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges’ list
against laws duly enacted by the people. Id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, it seems that Justice Thomas would agree with Justice Scalia. See id. at
80. (Thomas, J., concurring). “I write separately to note that neither party has
argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the
original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of
unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision.” Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Given that neither party had brought up the issue, Justice Thomas
opined that a parent’s fundamental right to control the upbringing of her children
resolved the case. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
90
Id. at 69.
91
See id. at 72-73.
92
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
93
Id. at 646.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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97

denied both constitutional rights.
In finding that the Illinois law violated equal protection and
procedural due process, the Court noted the extreme importance
that the Court has historically allotted to the family:
[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody,
and management of his or her children ‘come(s) to this Court
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
98
arrangements.’

Furthermore, the Court made clear that historically it had refused to
draw bright line rules based on the presence or absence of a marriage
99
ceremony.
As an example, the Court stated that in Levy v.
100
Louisiana, it had declared unconstitutional a state statute that
denied illegitimate children the right to bring a wrongful death
101
action following the death of their natural mother. In that case, the
Court had been influenced by the fact that familial bonds could be
just as warm and enduring as those within a more formal family
102
unit. Thus, the Court held that the mere fact that Peter Stanley had
never married Joan could not be used to deny him the fundamental
right to companionship, care, custody, and management of his
103
children.
104
In Lehr v. Robertson, however, the Court held that the state
could terminate an unmarried father’s parental rights without
105
providing procedural due process.
It distinguished Stanley by
noting that in that case, the father had a close relationship with his
children, but in Lehr, the father did not. The Court opined:
[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in
personal contact with his child acquires substantial
protection under the due process clause. At that point it
97

Id. at 651 (citing, inter alia, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
99
Id. at 651-52.
100
391 U.S. 68 (1968)
101
Id. (citing Levy, 391 U.S. at 71-72).
102
Id. at 652 (citing Levy, 391 U.S. at 71-72).
103
Id. at 658.
104
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
105
Id. at 265.
98
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may be said that he ‘act[s] as a father toward his children.’
But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection. The actions of judges
106
neither create nor sever genetic bonds.
Thus, the Court looked to the actual relationship that a parent
shared with his child to determine whether that parent had a
constitutional claim for continued companionship with his child
rather than arbitrarily assuming that every unwed father possessed
107
such an interest.
108
In another decision, Santosky v. Kramer, the Court reiterated
the importance of the right to companionship, care, custody, and
109
management of a child.
The Court emphasized that a biological
parent’s right to companionship, care, and custody of her children is
110
far more valuable than any property right. The decision primarily
dealt with procedural due process and held that a state must support
its allegations of parental neglect with clear and convincing evidence
111
before it can sever a parent’s rights in her natural child.
The
decision, however, referred to the parental right of “care, custody,
and management” of a child as a fundamental right under the Due
112
Process Clause.
This survey of cases makes clear that the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized and preserved fundamental rights involving
the family. Furthermore, the Court has shunned the use of arbitrary
lines and markers in determining whether a fundamental right exists.
Especially when dealing with non-traditional family units such as
those involving step-children and step-parents, the court has looked
to the actual relationship shared by parent and child to determine
whether there is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause.
III. CASES DISCUSSING THE PARENTAL RIGHT OF
COMPANIONSHIP WITH ADULT CHILDREN
The cases discussed in Part II of this Comment deal generally
with Supreme Court recognition of familial rights under the
substantive Due Process Clause. While they illustrate the Court’s
106

Id. at 261 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392, 389 n.7 (1979)).
Id. But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (holding that
even an unmarried father who had a close relationship with his child was not entitled
to due process when the child’s mother was married to another man).
108
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 758-59 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
111
See id. at 769.
112
Id. at 1394-95.
107
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expansive protection of the family, they all involve minor children in
their parents’ custody and thus point only vaguely towards the
recognition of a parental right of companionship with adult children
who are no longer in their parents’ custody. Lower courts, however,
have directly addressed parents’ right of companionship with adult
113
114
115
children and the Seventh, Tenth, and Ninth Circuits have ruled
116
117
118
that it is constitutionally protected. The First, Third, and D.C.
Circuits, however, have disagreed. This section surveys these cases.
A. Cases Extending Constitutional Protection to the Parental Right of
Companionship in Adult Children
1.

The Ninth Circuit
119

In Smith v. City of Fontana, the Ninth Circuit held that where it
had previously recognized a parental right of companionship with
120
minor children in Kelson v. City of Springfield, it was required as a
matter of logic to find a child’s right of companionship with
121
parents. Smith died as a result of excessive police violence during
122
Smith’s children alleged that the police officers had
his arrest.
violated their substantive due process rights “not to be deprived of
the life of their father and not to be deprived of his love, comfort,

113

Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that a father
had a constitutional right to companionship of an adult child, but that the adult
child’s siblings had no comparable right in their relationship with him).
114
Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 746 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding
that a mother and sister had a constitutionally protected interest in their relationship
with their son and brother).
115
Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
parents had a constitutionally protected interest in the companionship of their adult
son apart from their right to parent); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th
Cir. 2001) (finding that a mother had a right to the companionship of her mentallyincompetent adult son).
116
Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that neither a stepfather
nor siblings had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship of
an adult son and brother).
117
McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a father did not
have a constitutionally protected right of companionship with his adult son).
118
Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a
mother did not have a constitutionally protected right of companionship with her
adult son).
119
818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v.
de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999).
120
767 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1985).
121
Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418-20.
122
Id. at 1414.
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123

and support.”
Having already recognized a parental right of
companionship with children, the court found that the interest
logically extended to a child’s right in the companionship of his
parents:
We now hold that this constitutional interest in familial
companionship and society logically extends to protect children
from unwarranted state interference with their relationships with
their parents. The companionship and nurturing interest of
parent and child in maintaining a tight familial bond are
reciprocal, and we see no reason to accord less constitutional
value to the child-parent relationship than we accord to the
124
parent-child relationship.

The court acknowledged that allowing constitutional protection
for a child-parent relationship implicated no custody concerns,
125
unlike the parent-child relationship.
The court, however, found
this distinction insufficient to warrant differing constitutional
126
protection. The court explained:
When, as in this case, a child claims constitutional
protection for her relationship with a parent, there is no custodial
interest implicated, but only a companionship interest. This
distinction between the parent-child and the child-parent
relationships does not, however, justify constitutional protection
for one and not the other. We hold that a child’s interest in her
relationship with a parent is sufficiently weighty by itself to
127
constitute a cognizable interest.

The Ninth Circuit took the next step and first officially
recognized the right of companionship with adult children in
128
Strandberg v. City of Helena. The claim arose out of a situation where
police arrested the Strandbergs’ twenty-two year old son, Edward, for
129
reckless driving. After arresting him, the police took Edward to the
130
station and incarcerated him during the booking procedure.
Thirty minutes into the incarceration period, the police found
131
Edward hanging from the cell ceiling, dead. Among other claims,
123

Id. at 1417.
Id. at 1418.
125
Id. at 1419.
126
Id.
127
Smith, 818 F.2d at 1419. The court found support in its recognition of the noncustodial companionship right in Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748, 748
n.1 (9th Cir. 1986).
128
791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986).
129
Id. at 746.
130
Id.
131
Id.
124
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the Strandbergs filed suit for violation of their Fourteenth
132
Amendment rights.
The district court dismissed the Strandbergs’ claim that they had
been deprived of their constitutional right to parent the decedent
133
because Edward was past minority age. The Ninth Circuit, however,
viewed the Strandbergs’ claim of companionship under the
Fourteenth Amendment separate and apart from their right to
custody and control of Edward, and found that the district court had
134
In doing so, the court recognized the
not dismissed that claim.
135
right of companionship between parents and their adult child.
136
In Lee v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit confirmed its
recognition of the Fourteenth Amendment right of companionship
between parents and their adult children. The case arose out of the
two-year long wrongful incarceration of Kerry Sanders, the mentally
137
disabled son of Mary Sanders Lee.
After police arrested Sanders,
138
they mistakenly identified him as a fugitive named Robert Sanders.
The police department, however, failed to take appropriate steps to
139
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the police
confirm his identity.
failed to take proper fingerprints and should have known that
Sanders was not Robert Sanders because of his “obvious” mental
140
incapacity and different identifying characteristics.
The court
found that the actions of the police department, if true, constituted a
violation of Lee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to companionship of
141
her son.
2.

The Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit dealt with the question of a parental right to
132

Id. The plaintiffs also brought suit for violations of Edward’s rights under the
First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as
pendent state claims for assault and battery, negligence and gross negligence, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
133
Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 748 n.1.
134
Id.
135
See id.
136
250 F.3d 668, 685-86 (9th Cir. 2001).
137
Id. at 676-77.
138
Id. at 677.
139
Id. at 678.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 685-86. The opinion did not mention Kerry Sanders’ age; thus, one can
fairly assume that he was an adult. Furthermore, the court did not rely on any
special considerations of Sanders’ mental condition in finding a violation of his
mother’s constitutionally-protected companionship right. Therefore, the argument
that Lee is a special case dealing with the rights of parents in relation to their
mentally incompetent children is invalid.
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adult companionship in Bell v. City of Milwaukee. The case involved
143
a police officer’s shooting and killing of a black man, Daniel Bell,
and a subsequent conspiracy, allegedly racially motivated, to conceal
144
the facts underlying the shooting.
Daniel Bell’s siblings and the
estate of his father, Dolphus Bell, filed suit against the city of
Milwaukee and numerous members of the Milwaukee police
145
department for violation of their civil rights. Among other things,
plaintiffs asserted that the police officers’ actions interfered with
Dolphus Bell’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the
continued association of his son and the siblings’ comparable
146
associational right.
In finding a violation of Dolphus Bell’s constitutional rights, the
Seventh Circuit noted that in its decisions, the Supreme Court had
147
placed much importance on the parent-child relationship.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit addressed the defendants’
argument that Daniel Bell was no longer a minor and that Dolphus
148
Bell thus did not have an associational right with his son. The court
countered, however, “we are unpersuaded that a constitutional line

142

Bell, 746 F.2d 1205.
Id. at 1245. Daniel Bell was twenty-three years old, and thus, no longer a minor
at the time of the killing. Id. at 1245.
144
Id. at 1214-22.
145
Id. at 1224.
146
Id. The relevant statute under which plaintiffs based their claims is 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). The statute only provides a remedy for the deprivation of
constitutional and federal rights; it does not grant any substantive rights in and of
itself. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1232 n.29 (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org.,
441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979)).
147
Bell, 746 F.2d at 1243 (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (holding
that a state court that did not have personal jurisdiction over a mother could not cut
off her right to custody of her children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (holding that a child labor law as applied to a minor girl engaging in
religious solicitation did not violate the parents’ substantive due process right in
directing the upbringing of their child); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(holding that forced sterilization of certain categories of convicted criminals violated
a person’s right to procreate); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding that a
state law that proscribed teaching a subject in any other language but English
violated the parents’ right to control the upbringing of their children).
148
Bell, 746 F.2d at 1245.
143
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based solely on the age of the child should be drawn.”
The court
reasoned that more than mere custody of a minor was
constitutionally protected, and that the right extended to the
parent’s “‘interest in the companionship, care, custody, and
150
management’ of the child.”
The court added that even in
situations where a parent did not have legal custody of a child, the
Supreme Court had protected the right to care and companionship
151
of a child.
The Seventh Circuit panel also considered the particular familial
152
situation of Daniel Bell.
The court noted, “Daniel was single and
had no children. He had not become a part of another family unit;
153
his father’s family was his immediate family.”
The court also
considered the “warm and close” relationship Daniel Bell shared with
154
his father.
Additionally, the court reasoned that as opposed to
taking a child from a parent’s custody, the deprivation caused by the
killing of a child, as in Daniel Bell’s situation, was far more
155
remarkable. Thus, the court concluded that Daniel Bell’s majority
age was not a bar to recovery, but rather, a fact that the jury
appropriately could have taken into account when assessing the
156
damages to be awarded to Dolphus Bell’s estate.
149

Id.
Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); see discussion supra
Part II.D.
151
Id. (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979)) (holding that an
adoption law that allowed an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the
adoption of her child violated equal protection principles).
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Bell, 746 F.2d at 1245.
155
Id. “[T]his deprivation was far more substantial than the unlawful removal of a
child from the parent’s custody; it was the annihilation of the parent-child
relationship.” Id.
156
Id. In coming to this conclusion, the court considered three factors: (1) other
Seventh Circuit decisions that protected the parent-child relationship, see id. at 1244
(citing Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that due process
protects a parent’s relationship with his child); Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220,
1226-27 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that due process protects the interest in nurture
and development of a child)); (2) the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 from which § 1983 is derived, see id., (“[T]he Act was meant to create a remedy
where the parent-child relationship was interfered with by lawless, racially-motivated
violence.”); and (3) other federal appellate court decisions recognizing due process
violations for parental deprivations of custody and care of children in § 1983 actions,
see id. at 1244-45 (citing Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
that a plaintiff mother, whose son was transported to Germany by officials, had the
right to establish at trial a deprivation of her relationship with her son without due
process); Drollinger, 552 F.2d 1220 (holding that a grandfather’s claim that his
daughter-in-law’s probation conditions deprived him of his constitutional right to
150
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The Tenth Circuit

In Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Santa
157
Fe, the Tenth Circuit recognized a right of parental association with
158
adult children. The case concerned the wrongful death of Richard
159
As a
Trujillo while he was an inmate at the Santa Fe County Jail.
result, Richard’s mother, Rose Eileen Trujillo, and his sister, Patricia
Trujillo, filed suit claiming that Richard’s wrongful death deprived
them of their right of intimate familial association under the First
160
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Tenth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United
161
States Jaycees, which found that certain human relationships are
162
protected against undue interference by the State.
These
relationships included “[f]amily relationships, [which] by their
nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily
few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly
163
Thus, the court held that Rose
personal aspects of one’s life.”
Trujillo had a constitutionally protected right of association with her
164
son.

care and development of his grandchild was actionable under § 1983); Duchesne v.
Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that city bureau’s action of
retaining custody of children without judicial approval was a deprivation remediable
under § 1983)).
157
768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985).
158
Id. at 1189. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Bell court’s refusal to allow
siblings to claim the right of continued association, and it extended the right to
Richard’s sister, Patricia Trujillo. Id. The court stated, “[a]lthough the parental
relationship may warrant the greatest degree of protection and require the state to
demonstrate a more compelling interest to justify an intrusion on that relationship,
we cannot agree that other intimate relationships are unprotected and consequently
excluded from the remedy established by section 1983.” Id.
159
Id. at 1187.
160
Id.
161
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
162
Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188. Roberts dealt with an organization whom the Court
held was required to accept women as regular members. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
The Court held that such a requirement did not interfere with the Jaycees’ right to
intimate association. Id. at 621-22.
163
Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20).
164
Id. at 1189. Although the court found that Rose Trujillo had a constitutionally
protected right of association with her son, it maintained that to recover on the right,
she had to prove an intentional interference under § 1983. Id. at 1190. Because the
Trujillos’ complaint did not allege that the defendants acted with the intent to
deprive them of their relationship with their son and brother, the court held that the
Trujillos could not recover on the right. See id.
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B. Cases Declining to Recognize a Constitutional Parental Right of
Companionship in Adult Children
1.

The First Circuit

In direct opposition to the Ninth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits,
the First Circuit has held that there is no parental right of
165
companionship with adult children.
The First Circuit addressed
the matter in Ortiz v. Burgos, when Jose Valdivieso Ortiz’s stepfather
and siblings appealed the district court’s dismissal of their claims for
166
loss of companionship.
The case arose when prison guards
167
allegedly beat Ortiz to death while he was an inmate at a prison.
The court held that Supreme Court decisions establishing
constitutional protections for various facets of family life fell short of
establishing a liberty interest in the continued association of an adult
168
child.
The court divided Supreme Court decisions involving
familial liberty interests into two categories and reasoned that neither
169
of the categories applied in Ortiz’s situation.
The first category, the Ortiz court explained, involved decisions
in which the Supreme Court held that substantive due process
prohibits the government from interfering in particularly private
170
family decisions.
These private decisions included whether to
171
172
procreate, whether to educate one’s children in religious matters,
173
and how to define the family.
According to the court, these

165

Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986).
Id.
167
Id. at 7. The original plaintiffs were Ortiz’s mother, stepfather, and siblings.
Id. The defendants filed a motion seeking dismissal of all of the family member’s
claims, and the district court granted the motion for all but the mother’s claims. Id.
The stepfather and siblings then appealed dismissal of their claims in federal
appellate court. Id.
168
Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 7. The court cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (see
supra text accompanying notes 74-77), Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (see
supra note 79), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (see discussion infra
Part II.D.), all of which recognized the fundamental right to “freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life.” The court also cited Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972) (see discussion infra Part II.D.), recognizing the right of a parent to
“companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children.”
169
Ortiz, 807 F.2d.at 8.
170
Id.
171
Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). Griswold held that a
law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was an unconstitutional violation of the
right to marital privacy. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
172
Id. (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. 510).
173
Id. (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)). See supra notes
61-69 and accompanying text.
166
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Supreme Court decisions only established protection against the state
interfering with an individual’s right to decide how to conduct her
174
family affairs. Additionally, the court noted that in cases involving
parental rights, the Supreme Court had protected against
governmental interference in the rearing of minor children, not
175
adults.
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the Ortiz case was
different from the first category of cases in two respects: first, it did
not involve the government’s imposition of a choice in a private
176
family decision, and second, it did not involve a minor child. Thus,
177
the court concluded that the first category of cases was inapplicable.
Nor did the Ortiz situation fall under the second category of cases,
which according to the court, has held that when the state attempts
to change the relationship of a parent and her child in order to
further a legitimate state interest, it must adhere to strict procedural
requirements due to the fact that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
178
interest is implicated.
Finally, because the Ortiz case fell into
neither the first category nor the second category of cases, the court
concluded that Ortiz’s stepfather had no constitutional liberty
179
interest in his son’s companionship.
174

Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8.
Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 38-39 (1981))
(Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citations omitted) (“The Court has given particular
‘constitutional respect to a natural parent’s interest both in controlling the details of
the child’s upbringing . . . and in retaining the custody and companionship of the
child.’”). As examples of cases that protected this liberty interest, the court cited
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) (see supra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text), and Moore, 431 U.S. at 505. Ortiz, 807 F. 2d at 8.
176
Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8.
177
Id.
178
Id. As examples of this category of cases, the court cited Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982) (concerning termination of parental rights), Little v. Streater, 452
U.S. 1 (1981) (determining paternity), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(determining whether unwed father may retain custody of children after mother’s
death).
179
Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8. The court also held that Ortiz’s siblings had no
constitutional liberty interest in association with their brother, id., nor did the
mother have a similar interest. Id. at 7 n.1. Significantly, the court did admit that
Ortiz’s killing affected the parent-child relationship at least as irreversibly as a
severance in a parent-child relationship proceeding. Id. at 8. The court opined,
however, that the Supreme Court has only protected the relationship between parent
and child when the government deliberately severs or otherwise affects the
relationship, not when the severance is incidental as in the Ortiz case. Id. at 9. On
the other hand, the court noted that while some courts have allowed constitutional
protection for incidental deprivations, those cases at least involved one legal parent,
unlike the Ortiz situation. Id. at 9 n.3 (citing Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d
651, 653-55 (9th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1242-48 (7th
Cir. 1984); Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588, 593-95 (8th Cir. 1974); Myers v. Rask, 602
F. Supp. 210, 211-13 (D. Colo. 1985); Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848, 852-53
175
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The D.C. Circuit
180

In Franz v. United States,
the D.C. Circuit found that a
companionship right existed between a non-custodial parent and his
minor child. Franz dealt with a situation where various federal
officials had relocated and changed the identities of a divorced
mother and her minor children in accordance with the federal
181
Witness Protection Program.
The move resulted in severing the
relationship between the children and their non-custodial father,
who tried unsuccessfully to determine the location of his children in
182
order to make contact with them.
In finding that the father’s
constitutional right to companionship with his children had been
violated, the court noted that “[a]mong the most important of the
liberties accorded . . . special treatment is the freedom of a parent
and child to maintain, cultivate, and mold their ongoing
183
The willingness of the court to allow a right of
relationship.”
companionship for a non-custodial parent, “one who retains and
regularly exercises ‘visitation rights’ but who participates little in the
184
day-to-day care and nurturing of his children,”
displays that
custodial concerns need not be present for courts to recognize the
right.
The holding in Franz suggests that the D.C. Circuit would
recognize a companionship right between parents and adult
children, but surprisingly, the circuit has refused to recognize that
right on grounds that adult children are not as close to their parents
185
as minor children are. The D.C. Circuit dealt specifically with the
issue of the parental right of companionship with an adult child in
186
Butera v. District of Columbia. The case involved the death of 31-yearold Eric Butera while he was serving as an undercover operative for
187
the police department. Eric had become involved in the operation
after he called the police department with information about a

(E.D. Penn. 1977)).
180
707 F.2d 582, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
181
Franz, 707 F.2d at 589. The Witness Protection Program was initially
established as a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Id. at 586. Its
purpose is to provide protection for people who agree to testify against alleged
participants of organized criminal activity. Id.
182
Id. at 589.
183
Id. at 595.
184
Id.
185
Butera, 235 F.3d at 655-56.
186
235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
187
Id. at 640.
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188

homicide.
Following Eric’s death, his mother, Terry Butera, filed
suit against the District of Columbia and the four police officers who
supervised the operation, alleging that they had failed to provide
189
sufficient protection to Eric. The district court found for Terry, but
the circuit court reversed, holding that there is no parental liberty
interest in the companionship of an adult child who is
190
independent.
Although the court’s holding was contrary to the opinion of the
191
Seventh Circuit in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, the D.C. Circuit, like the
Seventh Circuit, engaged in a fact-intensive analysis, paying particular
attention to Eric Butera’s personal situation.
Terry Butera testified that her son was an adult, living on his own,
and that he was not providing her with any financial assistance at
the time of his death. The evidence further showed that Eric
Butera had moved out of his mother’s house when he was
eighteen years old, married, moved to Pennsylvania, and had a
192
child.

Concluding that Eric Butera was an independent adult who was past
minority age, the court held that Terry Butera had no constitutional
193
right in his companionship.
194
The court devoted much of its analysis to the Franz opinion, on
which the district court had relied when holding that Terry Butera
195
had a right of companionship with her son.
The Butera court
distinguished Franz by noting that Franz dealt with minor children
196
whereas Eric Butera was past minority age. Additionally, the court
explained that it was not prepared to follow Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
in which the Seventh Circuit had refused to draw a constitutional line
197
based solely on age.
The court instead posited that constitutional
treatment should differ depending on whether a child is past
minority age, in large part due to the court’s belief that the
relationship between a minor child and a parent is markedly different
198
from that of an adult child and a parent.
Finally, although the
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id. at 641.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 641.
746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); see infra, Part III.A.2 (discussing the opinion).
Butera, 235 F.3d at 654.
Id. at 656.
Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Butera, 235 F.3d at 654.
Id. at 655.
Id. (citing Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984)).
Id. at 655-56 (citing Franz, 712 F.2d at 1432). “When children grow up, their
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court conceded the significance of the parent-child relationship
regardless of a child’s age, it held that the precedent of Franz could
not be read so broadly as to establish a constitutional liberty interest
199
in companionship between a parent and an adult child.
While the Butera opinion held that Terry Butera did not have a
constitutional liberty interest in companionship with her adult son,
the court was careful to limit its holding to the particular facts of the
200
situation. The opinion states, “we hold that a parent does not have
a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the companionship of a
201
child who is past minority and independent.” Hence, Butera’s holding
202
only applies when an adult child is independent. The opinion does
not provide guidance regarding a dependent adult child, for
example, if a child is a college student past the age of minority, but
not yet an independent adult.
Rejecting a right of companionship between parents and adult
203
children solely based on assumptions about relationships is wrong.
Experience shows that companionship may be present in a
relationship between a parent and an adult child and it need not be
204
present in the relationship between a minor and a parent. If a noncustodial parent has a right to the company of his minor children
with whom he only exercises visitation rights and with whose day-today care and nurturing he has little involvement, the right must be
based on companionship alone and extend to situations where
custody and child-rearing concerns are not present. It should also
extend to the relationship between a parent and his adult child, at
least in those cases where a close bond continues to exist.
3.

The Third Circuit

The Third Circuit recently considered the issue of the
205
substantive due process right of companionship in adult children.
McCurdy v. Dodd dealt with the fatal shooting of Donta Dawson, a
dependence on their parents for guidance, socialization, and support gradually
diminishes. At the same time, the strength and importance of the emotional bonds
between them and their parents usually decrease.” Id.
199
Id. at 656.
200
Id.
201
Butera, 235 F.3d at 656 (emphasis added).
202
Id.
203
For more discussion on this topic and other related topics, see infra Part IV. In
essence, research indicates that the parent-child relationship may actually grow
stronger with age. See, e.g., Chris Knoester, Transitions in Young Adulthood and the
Relationship Between Parent and Offspring Well-Being, SOC. FORCES, June 1, 2003, at 1431.
204
See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
205
McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2003).

2005

COMMENT

1147

nineteen year-old male, stemming from a Philadelphia police
206
As a result,
officer’s mistaken belief that Dawson was armed.
Dawson’s biological father, Bobby McCurdy, filed suit against several
207
police officers and the city of Philadelphia.
In finding against
McCurdy, the court held that there is no substantive due process
208
right in the companionship of an adult, independent child.
The court’s opinion first recognized that substantive due process
analysis “‘requires scrupulous attention to the guideposts that have
209
Like the Ortiz decision, the Third
previously been established.’”
Circuit opined that these guideposts required only protecting
210
parental choice and decision-making for minor children.
Such a
fundamental right, then, “must cease to exist at the point at which a
child begins to assume the critical decisionmaking responsibility for
211
himself or herself.”
Lastly, however, the court recognized that the analysis need not
always be so clear-cut. The court explained that although in the
majority of cases, adulthood would be determined by the state’s age
of majority, in a small percentage of cases, a parent may be able to
rebut the presumption of adulthood by providing clear and
212
convincing evidence that her child was not emancipated. Because
206

Id. at 822. Dawson was sitting alone in a parked car when police officers
approached him to inquire whether he needed any help. Id. After repeated
demands to raise his hands, Dawson remained unresponsive. Id. Believing that
Dawson had a gun, Philadelphia police officer Christopher DiPasquale shot Dawson
in the head, resulting in his death. Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 830.
209
Id. at 826 (quoting Bayanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d
396, 400 (3d Cir. 2000)).
210
McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 826-27.
211
Id. at 829. Additionally, the McCurdy court followed Ortiz in finding that the
Due Process Clause only protects liberty interests when the state takes deliberate
actions against life, liberty, or property—not when the state’s actions are negligent.
Id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)). Hence, because Officer
DiPasquale’s actions were not deliberately directed against the parent-child
relationship, the court found that it would be stretching due process too far if it were
to recognize a fundamental right in Dawson’s companionship. Id. at 830.
212
Id. at 830. As an example of a situation where the court might find a right of
companionship in an adult child, the court provided the facts of Geiger v. Rouse, 715
A.2d 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). Id. at 830 n.8. That case dealt with a child, over the
age of eighteen, who had cerebral palsy and was completely dependent on her
parents. McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830 n.8. Thus, it seems that the Third Circuit would
only allow a parent to recover for the loss of an adult child in an extreme situation,
for example, when she has an illness that renders her completely dependent. This
Comment argues that a parental right of companionship in adult children should be
recognized not only in such extreme situations, but also when a parent and adult
child share a close and fulfilling relationship, even if they are not totally dependent
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McCurdy had provided no evidence of Dawson’s lack of
emancipation, the Third Circuit held that McCurdy had no right of
213
companionship with his son.
IV. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS THAT SUPPORT RECOGNITION OF A
214
PARENTAL RIGHT OF COMPANIONSHIP IN ADULT CHILDREN
Limiting a right of companionship to only minor children is not
in line with reality. Experience shows that filial bonds between
parent and child can exist well beyond the time when a child reaches
the age of majority, and that they can cease to exist well before that
age. It is contrary to human experience to assume that a parent does
not suffer a loss of companionship from tragic events severing the
relationship between parent and child after that child reaches a
certain age, or that the parent automatically does suffer such a loss
when the child is a minor. As one court has stated,
[s]urely nature recoils from the suggestion that the society,
companionship and love which compose filial consortium
automatically fade upon emancipation; while common
sense and experience teach that the elements of consortium
can never be commanded against a child’s will at any age.
The filial relationship, admittedly intangible, is ill-defined
by reference to the ages of the parties and ill-served by
arbitrary age distinctions. . . . Therefore, to suggest as a
matter of law that compensable consortium begins at birth
and ends at age eighteen is illogical and inconsistent with
common sense and experience. Human relationships
215
cannot and should not be so neatly boxed.
Social science data indicate that the parent-child relationship
216
A recent study
may actually grow more significant with age.
concludes that the parent-child relationship is important for the
psychological well-being of both parents and children throughout the

on one another.
213
Id. at 830-31.
214
As discussed in Part I, substantive due process analysis does not look to social
and economic trends to determine what is and is not a fundamental right, but rather
to the Nation’s traditions and values. Part IV, therefore, does not claim that the
parental right to companionship in adult children should be recognized because of
current social trends. Rather, these trends are presented as evidence that reaching
the age of majority does not necessarily end the parent-child relationship or diminish
it to a point that it no longer merits constitutional protection.
215
Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 959 (Ariz. 1986)
(dealing with state loss of consortium claims, not substantive due process claims).
216
Timothy D. Ament, Parents’ Loss of Consortium Claims for Adult Children in Iowa:
The Magical Age of Eighteen, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 247, 259 (1992).
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course of life, not only when children are minors.
Moreover, the
study finds that the existence of a bond between a parent and adult
218
child is key to each individual’s well-being.
Parents and adult
children who have intimate ties experience “a sense of security and
219
belonging, a perception that one is cared for deeply.”
Furthermore, elderly parents need not be biologically related to
220
adult children to experience intimacy.
If a stepchild’s parent
remarries early in life, he may view the stepparent as mother or father
221
by the time the child is an adult.
Thus, the “step” aspect may
222
become less meaningful as children and parents age. This may be
223
more true in some cultures than others.
Numerous studies have shown that contrary to popular
misconception, parents and adult children often have substantial
224
amounts of contact, sometimes as often as weekly or more.
Although contact need not be directly related to quality of
relationship, as discussed earlier, studies indicate that parent-child
225
relationships often grow stronger with age. Many elderly adults are
single, widowed, or divorced; for these people, a grown child may be
226
their only social contact.
Hence, the assumption that the parent
and child bond automatically grows less important or weaker as
parents and children age is not consistent with recent social science
data. Ending a parental right of companionship with children at age
eighteen would be unrealistic.
217

Chris Knoester, Transitions in Young Adulthood and the Relationship Between Parent
and Offspring Well-Being, SOC. FORCES, June 1, 2003, at 1431.
218
Id.
219
Karen L. Fingerman, A Distant Closeness: Intimacy Between Parents and Their
Children Later in Life, 25 GENERATIONS 26, 27 (2001). The characteristics of intimacy
shared by elderly parents and adult children, however, are unlike those of other
intimate ties. Id. at 29. This intimacy can be more rewarding than the intimacy
experienced between parents and children in early life. Id. “In late life, intimacy
feels more voluntary, more reciprocal, more mutual, and more controllable than the
closeness that is demanded when offspring are young.” Id.
220
Id. at 27.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
See id. For example, African Americans often treat fictive kin as their own
offspring. “Nieces, nephews, or unrelated younger adults from a church or
community may serve in the role of a grown child.” Id.
224
Lorraine T. Dorfman, Retirement and Family Relationships: An Opportunity in Later
Life, 26 GENERATIONS 74, 76 (2002).
225
See Ament, supra note 216, at 259 and see id. If the parent and child did not
share a close relationship before the parent’s retirement, however, it is unlikely that
they will afterwards. Dorfman, supra note 224, at 76.
226
See Fingerman, supra note 219, at 26. In fact, approximately eighty percent of
women and forty percent of men over age seventy-five do not have a spouse. Id.
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Another factor that urges recognition of a parental right of
companionship in adult children is the realization that many adult
227
children are the primary caretakers of their elderly parents.
Although minor children require nurturing from their parents, as
parents and children age, parents may require physical, social, and
228
economic support from their adult children.
It is estimated that
22.4 million American households, nearly one in four, actually
229
provide care to elderly adults, and this number is expected to
230
increase to 39 million households by 2007.
Significantly,
approximately twenty-seven percent of all caregivers for elderly
231
parents are daughters and about fifteen percent are sons.
An increasing number of households will take on the
responsibility of caring for elderly parents due to the phenomenon
232
known as the “graying of America.”
It is a well-known fact that
members of the baby-boomer population are expected to survive into
233
their eighties and nineties. The number of elderly people has more
than doubled since 1960, from approximately 17 million to 36
234
million in 2003. It is estimated that there will be 51 million people
235
By the year 2020, twenty
over 65 by 2020 and 67 million by 2040.
percent of the American population will be over the age of sixty236
five.
Currently, about one third of the adults over age sixty-five
years old have a severe disability and more than sixteen percent
237
require assistance with daily living activities. For people eighty years
227

EMILY K. ABEL, WHO CARES FOR THE ELDERLY? PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
EXPERIENCES OF ADULT DAUGHTERS 4 (1991). “Families will always be the essential
core of the long-term-care system, whether they are providing direct care or
arranging and overseeing care provided by others.” See also Judith A. Riggs, A Family
Caregiver Policy Agenda for the Twenty-first Century, 27 GENERATIONS 68, 72 (2003-2004).
228
See Ament, supra note 216, at 259.
229
Taking a Vacation at a Nursing Home, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at D1.
230
Mariko Thompson, Handle with Care How Family Members Can Work Together when
Elderly Parents Need Help, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, at U4.
231
Id.
232
For a discussion of the phenomenon and its implications, see Kevin C. Fleming
et al., A Cultural and Economic History of Old Age in America, MAYO CLINIC PROC., July 1,
2003, at 914 [hereinafter Fleming, History of Old Age].
233
Id.
234
Judy Singleton, Women Caring for Elderly Family Members: Shaping Non-Traditional
Work and Family Initiatives, 31 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 367, 369 and U.S. Census Bureau,
National
Population
Estimates,
available
at
http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2003/NC-EST2003-02.pdf.
235
Singleton, supra note 234, at 369.
236
Fleming, History of Old Age, supra note 232, at 914.
237
Kevin C. Fleming et al., Caregiver and Clinician Shortages in an Aging Nation,
MAYO CLINIC PROC., Aug. 1, 2003, at 1026 [hereinafter Fleming, Caregiver and
Clinician Shortages].
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and older, this degree of impairment is present in more than half.
Along with this increase in the elderly population comes the
reminder that old age has traditionally been a problem in American
239
culture for all but the very wealthy. The elderly usually do not have
240
enough savings to maintain their former standard of living.
Moreover, those who can afford to live in nursing homes frequently
241
Care provided in nursing
face malnutrition and general neglect.
homes may deteriorate due to the current nursing shortage, a result
242
of the aging of the nursing population and vocational burnout.
Given all these factors, it is likely that more and more children will
take on the responsibility of caring for their elderly parents and will
continue to share intimate bonds.
Terminating a right of
companionship between parents and children at age eighteen is
inconsistent with these social trends.
CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY
Although the Supreme Court has urged restraint in implying
243
fundamental rights,
the recognition of a parental right of
companionship in adult children does not stray from substantive due
process guidelines. The crux of substantive due process analysis looks
to the traditions and culture of the American people in determining
whether or not there exists a fundamental right that deserves
244
constitutional protection.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has
consistently explained that American tradition emphasizes familial
245
relationships, especially those of parent and child. Additionally, the
Court has, on numerous occasions, discouraged the imposition of
bright line rules in fundamental rights analysis and favored a fact246
intensive approach. For these reasons, it is anomalous to cut off a
238

Id.
Fleming, History of Old Age, supra note 232, at 914.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
See Fleming, Caregiver and Clinician Shortages, supra note 237. More factors
contributing to the nursing shortage include fewer available workers and job
dissatisfaction. Id.
243
See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
244
See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
245
See supra Part II (discussing fundamental rights involving the family that the
Supreme Court has recognized).
246
See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court has
displayed its unparalleled respect for the parent-child relationship by recognizing the
importance of parent-child bonds even without a traditional biological relationship
or a marriage between the parents. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72 and 92103.
239

1152

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1121

parental constitutional right of companionship at the age of majority.
Even more so, it seems illogical to recognize a right to keep the
247
family together and a right to the companionship, care, custody,
248
and management of one’s children, but to not allow a general
parental right of companionship in children.
Courts should extend a constitutional fundamental right to
parents in the companionship of their adult children. This right
should extend to foster parents and unwed natural parents as well as
married biological parents. A survey of substantive due process cases
illustrates that the Court has refused to assume that the nature of a
foster parent’s or unwed parent’s relationship with her child is
automatically less worthy of constitutional protection than a married
249
natural parent’s relationship with her child.
Thus, the right to
companionship of an adult child should not be automatically defined
to exist only for natural, married parents.
Because of the great weight the Supreme Court has accorded
the parent-child relationship, the circuits that have refused to
recognize a right of companionship between parents and adult
children are wrong. The allowance of the right is in line with
substantive due process analysis because the court has repeatedly
shunned the use of arbitrary lines and markers. Refusing to extend
the right of companionship between parents and children beyond
the age of eighteen is exactly that – an arbitrary marker.
Furthermore, the courts that refuse to recognize the right base much
of their analysis on the fact that the parent-child relationship grows
weaker with age. Significantly, however, current research indicates
250
otherwise.
Using the state’s age of majority as a marker for recovery creates
the illogical situation where a deadbeat father is unjustly enriched
from his child’s death as long as the child is a minor, and an involved
and attached father gets no recovery because his child happens to be
an adult. Rather than cutting off a right of companionship at the age
of majority, a court should determine whether a parent has a valid
constitutional claim for loss of companionship in a child based on the
251
relationship that he and his child shared.
247

See supra Part II.B (discussing the right).
See supra Part II.D and Part III.A (discussing the right and cases that have
recognized the right without custody concerns being present).
249
See supra notes 71-72, 92-107 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving
foster parents and unwed biological parents).
250
See supra Part IV.
251
This is what the Seventh Circuit did in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205,
1245 (7th Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 142-154. Although the D.C.
248
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For example, when due to unlawful state action, a father loses a
minor child with whom he has not spoken in years, he should not be
able to recover on a constitutional right of companionship, regardless
of the fact that his child was a minor. On the other hand, when a
father loses an adult child with whom he has a close and loving
relationship, he should be able to recover for his loss, regardless of
the fact that his child was nineteen years old or even thirty. Although
no amount of damages can compensate for the death of a child, such
a framework for recovery comes closer to compensating parents
252
justly.
Along with being in line with general substantive due process
guidelines, the recognition of a parental right of companionship in
adult children is in line with the reality of parent-child relationships
in America. “Researchers have exploded the myth that families
253
abandon their elderly relatives.” In fact, parents and adult children
often share intimate relationships that can be more rewarding than
254
the relationships they shared early in life.
Though not a part of
substantive due process analysis, social and economic trends also
indicate that recognition of the right would be wise.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance
of familial relationships without the imposition of arbitrary markers.
The Fourteenth Amendment parental right of companionship in
adult children is not the place to begin to impose such arbitrary
bright line rules.

Circuit conducted a similar analysis in Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637
(D.C. Cir. 2001), see supra text accompanying notes 191-193, the court still decided to
cut off a right of companionship at the age of majority, see supra text accompanying
notes 197-199. It is unclear what conclusion the court would have come to if the
child had not been an independent adult, for example, if he were a college student.
See supra text accompanying notes 200-202.
252
Of course, conducting a fact-intensive analysis is more difficult than imposing a
bright-line rule. Even courts that have refused to recognize the right, however, have
done so at least partly on the basis of a fact-intensive analysis. Furthermore, the
position to which the Supreme Court has elevated the parent-child relationship
discourages the imposition of bright line rules and markers in place of profound
analyses.
253
ABEL, supra note 227, at 3.
254
See supra notes 215-226 and accompanying text.

